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Abstract. Creating the specification of a system by focusing primarily
on the detailed properties of the digital controller can lead to complex
descriptions that are nearly incoherent. An argument given by Hayes,
Jackson, and Jones provides reasons to focus first on the wider environ-
ment in which the system will reside. In their approach are two major
ideas: pushing out the specification boundaries, and carefully distinguish-
ing between the requirements of the system and the assumptions about
the environment. Pushing out the boundaries of the system specifica-
tion to include the pragmatic intent of the system being specified allows
the specification to be understood relative to the environmental con-
text, rather than remaining a mysterious black box in isolation. Clar-
ifying the distinction between assumptions about the environment and
requirements that the specification must meet increases the clarity of the
specification, and has the potential to seriously reduce the complexity of
the final specification. The example of a gas burner is explored in depth
to illustrate this approach to system specification.
1 Overview of approach
The general idea of the “Hayes/Jackson/Jones” (HJJ) approach [1] is simple:
for many technical systems it is easier to derive their specification from one
of a wider system in which physical phenomena are measurable. Even though
the computer cannot affect the physical world directly, it is still worthwhile to
start with the wider system. The message can be given as its converse: do not
jump into specifying the digital system in isolation. If one starts by recording
the requirements of the wider physical system, the specification of the technical
components can then be derived from that of the overall system; assumptions
about the physical components are recorded as rely-conditions for the technical
components.
In order to be able to write this style of specification, some technical work
derived from earlier publications of Hayes, Jackson and Jones has to be brought
? This publication originally appeared as a chapter in M. Butler, C. Jones, A. Ro-
manovsky, E. Troubitsyna, editors, Rigorous development of complex fault tolerant
systems, LNCS #4157. Please cite that version instead of this technical report.
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Fig. 1. Bridging from the physical world to a digital control system
together. The process of deriving the specification of the software system involves
recording assumptions about the non-software components. These assumptions
are recorded as rely conditions because we know how to reason about them
from earlier work on concurrency (e.g. [2–4]). In most cases, we need to reason
about the continuous behaviour of physical variables like altitude: earlier work
by Hayes and Mahony provides suitable notation [5]. The emphasis on “problem
frames” comes from Jackson’s publications [6].
An example of the HJJ approach is a computer-controlled temperature sys-
tem. One should not start by specifying the digital controller; rather, an initial
specification in terms of the actual temperature should be written. In order to
derive the specification of the control system, one needs to record assumptions
(as rely-conditions) about the accuracy of sensors; there will also be assumptions
about the fact that setting digital switches results in a change in temperature.
Once the specification of the control system has been determined, its design and
code can be created as a separate exercise. At all stages — but particularly be-
fore deployment — someone has to make the decision that the rely conditions
are in accordance with the available equipment. Figure 1 gives an abstract view
of the HJJ approach. The referenced [1] outlines this procedure on a “sluice
gate” controller. The analysis includes looking at tolerating faults by describing
weaker guarantees in the presence of weaker rely conditions.
Notice that it is not necessary to build a complete model of the physical
components like motors, sensors and relays: only to record assumptions. But
even in the simple sluice gate example of [1], it becomes clear that choosing
the perimeter of the system is a crucial question: one can consider the physical
phenomena to be controlled as the height of the gate, or the amount of water
flowing; or the humidity of the soil; or even the farm profits. Each such scope
results in different sorts of rely-conditions.
2 Examining the System
2.1 The Example
Our running example in this paper is the specification of a control program for
a gas-burner. The gas-burner is very similar to the one used in [7]. A thermostat
provides allows the whole system to react to its environment, and the rest consists
of a gas-valve/nozzle assembly, a sensor to detect the flame, and an ignition
transformer. The whole system also includes a computer and a thermostat. The
requirements given in [7] include some detail for intended operation and safety,
and there is also a requirement that the system must operate in an efficient
manner [8].
We are presented with three initial requirements taken verbatim from [7]:
R1 In order to ensure safety the gas concentration in the environment must at
all time be kept below a certain threshold
R2 The gas-burner should burn when heat request is on, provided the gas ignites
and burns without faults
R3 The gas-burner should not burn when heat request is off
There is also a set of assumptions about the environment which will be touched
on when we investigate the rely-conditions for this system.
So far we have presented almost no context for the gas-burner system, and
our source for the example provides little other than what has been mentioned
thus far. At this point, trying to generate a specification would be dangerous
as our assumptions — still unrecorded — about the system would colour the
requirements produced. First, then, we must consider the context and use of
this system.
2.2 The Context
We know that this system reacts to its environment due to the signal provided
by a thermostat. This implies an environment that is colder than the burn-
temperature of the gas that will be used, as well as an environment that has
the tendency to cool down — at least in the area of the thermostat. It would
also seem reasonable to assume that the thermostat will turn the heat request
signal on when the temperature crosses a low threshold, and off when it exceeds
another threshold.
This leads to ruling out a larger set of possible uses: the gas-burner is not
intended as a venting mechanism for something like a refinery. It seems unlikely
that the need to vent gas would be triggered by a temperature (at least, high
temperature gas would not be burnt because of a need for heat). There are also
other usage scenarios that could be ruled out; we will not go into them here.
We also do not know why we are burning gas — perhaps the intention is to
heat the pipes in a boiler, or the bottom of a pot on a gas hob, or just the air
in a gas over or furnace.
For our investigation we will fix the system components to those mentioned
at the beginning of Section 2.1, and assume that the gas-burner is intended to
heat the air around it.
2.3 The Boundaries
The original development of a specification for the gas-burner in [7] starts by
constructing a system model without fully examining the boundaries between
the system and its surrounding environment. That development does provide an
explicit model of an environment, but it provides little in the way of justification
about the source and accuracy of that model. The definitions of the boundaries —
and their subsequent extension — is not so much an exercise in specifying a larger
system as it is one designed to help ensure that the specification encompasses
all of the pertinent pieces.
Let us consider issues related to the gas itself. Our source gives the require-
ment (R1) that the concentration of gas in the atmosphere must be kept below a
certain threshold for “safety”. What does that mean? The first obvious concern
is explosions, of course — it is likely that a high concentration of gas would
explode if ignited. But there are other concerns, especially if people will be in
the same environment as the gas-burner: while unlikely, it is possible that, for
certain types of gas, asphyxiation or intoxication can be caused by a much lower
concentration than is required for an explosion.
Considering the safety properties of the gas, there are also several deeper
properties that should be examined. We are assuming a specific type of gas —
possibly the same natural gas that is commonly piped into houses. What would
happen if a different type of gas were to be used? If we look at the environment
in which the gas-burner will be placed, what assumptions are there? Is it well-
vented? Does it have a “standard” atmospheric gas mix (as opposed to a pure O2
atmosphere)? These considerations — when decided upon — must be recorded
as assumptions.
So much for the properties of the gas on its own; let us bring the gas valve
and nozzle under consideration. We will assume that it is not possible for a
flame to “hide” within the nozzle of the burner as it can with some varieties
of oxyacetylene welding torches. Part of the justification for this assumption is
to limit our system’s boundaries such that we do not have to consider the gas
delivery system. In that vein, we are also going to consider the gas valve to be
an ideal component — its sealing mechanism never fails; it delivers a constant
flow-rate of gas into the environment; and if it ever does fail, it will fail in such
as was as to not release any further gas.
A physical nozzle typically delivers a varying rate of gas as it is turned on
or off, however, the assumption in this example is that the nozzle’s behaviour
will appear binary, delivering either no gas to the environment, or a constant
rate of flow. The development framework used is capable of modelling a variable
flow-rate, but doing so would add little to this exposition.
The ignition transformer generates a spark to ignite the gas, but it is hardly
the only way the gas could ignite. If a person were to hold a lit match near
the gas nozzle, that would suffice to ignite the gas if the valve were opened. In
an open environment there are many possible ignition sources: our specification
must rely only on the ignition transformer.
On reflection, it seems that assuming that the ignition transformer is not the
only source of ignition is a reasonable thing to do: if our specification is written
such that the gas is only ever turned on when we actually want to burn it, then
the source of ignition is irrelevant. If we do not want to burn gas then our usual
behaviour is such that the ambient concentration of gas is being reduced. Note
that there is no actual requirement from the source document to keep the gas
off — just one not to burn it if the heat request signal is off (requirement R3).
The flame sensor is assumed to be able to detect a flame if one is present.
The failure mode of the system, if it does not detect the presence of a flame,
would be precisely the same as if the gas had failed to ignite in the first place
— the gas would be shut off and the system would wait until the specified time
for gas dissipation expired. If the sensor indicated the presence of a flame when
there was none present, then, while it is possible to detect the fault, the system
would be in a very dangerous state.
Now we hit an issue that falls firmly into the realm of fault tolerance, and is
outside our given requirements: what should the system do if it cannot produce
a flame, even after many attempts? (In this case, “cannot produce a flame”
includes being unable to detect the presence of a flame.) Given our assumption
that if the gas valve fails it will be closed, it is certainly safe to let the system
continue to try to ignite the (possibly not present) gas, but that hardly fits the
notion of an efficient gas-burner.
The thermostat in the system presents many opportunities to widen the
scope of the system. The initial requirements and description suggest that the
thermostat contains only a simple on/off switch (or, more precisely, the interface
it presents to the controller will be a boolean value). What considerations are
required for a thermostat that exports an interface that is a percentage of the
maximum possible heat output? Can our gas-burner support that? One designed
for a gas oven would certainly have to do so.
All of the components in the system — to varying degrees — need to be
concerned with “value stutter”. How quickly can the system produce flame; how
quickly can it be extinguished; what sort of delay is required between those
transitions? How often can we transition over a given period of time? Since it
is the thermostat which controls the heat request signal, what are its transition
properties? These questions push the specification boundaries in the temporal
domain, helping determine the lowest granularity level that the specification is
concerned with.
2.4 The Larger Context, Briefly
So, we have now investigated the components of the system and seen how they
can affect the specification and requirements. Let us look at the larger context
of the system. We have already identified some of the scenarios that we are not
concerned with and identified a reasonable, immediate context for the burner:
heating the air around it.
What is the larger context: what kind of larger system could this gas-burner
be a component of? Could there be an unmentioned backup system that might
be used if this gas-burner fails? If so, then the simplest — and possibly best —
error-mode for this gas-burner would be to simply shut down. More important,
however, is that a second gas-burner would invalidate all of the assumptions
about the concentration of gas in the environment — we rely on this gas-burner
being the only source of gas.
3 An Idealised Specification
Having now thoroughly considered the context that our system is in, we can
finally begin its specification. To do so we are using the same notation as in [1];
systems are either implicitly specified using a system block, or built out of
operators like until/corrects. The system block is an implicit specification,
using keywords such as external, input, output, rely, and guarantee. The
keywords mentioned here are not an exhaustive list as the notation can easily
tolerate extension.
The external keyword is used to identify variables that are important to the
behaviour of the system but are not actually a part of the system being specified.
These variables are eventually eliminated from the specification of the control
software through reification. The input and output keywords are similar to
the VDM rd and wr keywords — they name the variables that the system can
access.
At the heart of the behavioural notions are the rely and guarantee key-
words. The rely-condition states the behaviour that the designer of the system
expects of, and depends on, from the environment. As noted elsewhere, the sys-
tem might be deployed in an environment that violates the rely-condition — it
is the responsibility of the user of the system to ensure that the rely-condition
holds. The guarantee-condition complements the rely-condition by describing the
behaviour that the system must conform to in an environment which respects
the rely-condition. Although the system is, formally, free of any behavioural
constraints if the rely-condition is violated, we show some mechanisms to place
constraints on a system under certain violations of the rely in Section 4.
Using this notation we can describe an idealised version of the gas-burner
system as
GasBurnerSystem0 4
system
external Concentration
inputs Temperature
outputs GasFlow ,Spark ,Flame
rely PhysicalProperties ∧GluingAssumptions ∧ Idealisations
guarantee OperationalProperties ∧ LowConcentrationLevel
The idealised system is built under the assumption that everything is working
properly. We will use structures such as until/corrects in Section 4 to add
fault-tolerant features to the system.
In this version of the specification we have Concentration defined as an ex-
ternal variable as it is not possible for any part of this system to directly (or
indirectly) measure the concentration of gas in the environment. Before the final
specification could be handed off to be implemented all of the external variables
must be removed. The presence of external variables in the initial specification
serves to record the environmental factors: the details about why the system ex-
hibits certain behaviours. This allows us to derive — and justify the derivation
of — specifications that do not use these inaccessible external variables. The
Concentration variable represents the concentration of gas in the environment
immediately surrounding the nozzle of the gas-burner. We make the assumption
that the gas diffuses evenly into the environment, and the Concentration vari-
able is continuous in both domain (time) and range (percentage of gas in the
environment).
The system only has Temperature as an input variable. This represents the
temperature in the vicinity of the thermostat. The variable is continuous in both
its domain (time) and range (temperature at the thermostat). We could easily
put bounds on the range of the value, defining an operational temperature range,
but they add little to the exposition here.
The output variables of the system — GasFlow , Spark , and Flame — are all
boolean-valued and, respectively, represent whether or not the gas is on, whether
or not the ignition transformer is producing sparks, and the presence of a flame
caused by the combustion of gas.
Before moving on to the system’s behaviour, note that all of the input and
output variables will become external variables when the controller is specified.
Because the controller is only able to interact through the signals it receives
and emits, it will be unable to directly access the physical state of the over-
all system. So, in turn, the input and output variables of the overall system
will not be present in the specification that is used to generate the controller’s
implementation.
The rely-condition for this system has been expressed as three conjuncts,
each of which describes a class of assumptions about the environment. The
PhysicalProperties is intended to record the physics that the system relies on, and
is written in terms that are independent of the system itself. To relate the compo-
nents of the system to the physical assumptions we use the GluingAssumptions
conjunct. It makes the connection between things like the IgnitionSource of
PhysicalProperties to the Spark output variable. It has been implicitly idealised,
assuming that all transitions happen instantaneously; the extra complexity of
modelling the delay in transition from one state to another is unnecessary for
this illustration. The last portion, Idealisations, is a set of properties that allow
the system at this level to ignore fault tolerance concerns.
The guarantee-condition of this system has two conjuncts: one of which ex-
presses the actual desired behaviour; the other expresses a sort of behaviour
we wish to exclude. The OperationalProperties gives the core behaviour that
is desired from the gas-burner system. This portion is uncluttered by any no-
tion of fault-tolerance, error detection/correction, or system constraints. The
second conjunct, LowConcentrationLevel , deals with a particularly important
safety condition that our system must respect: it must not cause the concentra-
tion of gas to exceed a certain level.
3.1 The Notation Used in Properties
The notation used to denote individual properties is essentially that developed
by Mahony and Hayes [5] and used in [1]. The basic intuition is that all state
variables can be treated as continuous functions over a time domain.
The time domain is usually denoted at T , and the expression interval T
represents the set of all possible open, finite intervals of time within that time
domain. It is of note that it is possible to consider T as an interval in its own
right, and that given I as an interval in T , interval I simply represents all of
the possible sub-intervals in I . The letters I , J , and K are typically used to
stand for intervals.
Where they are defined, state variables map specific points in time to values,
so they cannot be used directly with intervals. However, for an interval I and a
predicate P , we write P over I to mean that the predicate holds for all points
in I . This notation is shorthand for ∀i ∈ I · P(i).
Similar to the over operator, there is a form of integration that is used as in
the Duration Calculus [9]. For some predicate, P , the expression
∫
I
P gives the
length of time that P was true in the interval I . There is also a shorthand nota-
tion that represents the total length of a duration, written #I , that is equivalent
to writing
∫
I
true.
Two related predicates over intervals are precedes and adjoins. For the
former, if I preceeds J , then we know that the supremum of I is less than or
equal to the infimum of J . The latter, where I adjoins J , is the stronger case
where the supremum of I is equal to the infimum of J .
3.2 Idealised Rely-Conditions
The PhysicalProperties conjunct contains a model of the physics that is impor-
tant to the gas-burner. These properties do not so much have to be used to
select the environment as verified themselves that they reflect the physics of the
environment. These properties are specified in general terms, using the variable
Combustion to represent any sort of gas combustion, including explosions. We
will later relate the machine-specific Flame variable to the general environmental
property of combustion represented by the Combustion variable.
One such property is the fact that gas, even in high concentrations, will not
spontaneously combust without something to ignite it.
∀I , J : interval T ·
 I adjoins J ∧ ¬Combustion over I ∧¬ IgnitionSource over (I ∪ J )
⇒ ¬Combustion over J

That is, given two adjoining intervals I and J , if the gas is not lit during I , and
there is nothing to ignite the gas during either I or J , then the gas will not be
lit during J . This holds for any adjoining pair of intervals. One thing to note
about that formula is that IgnitionSource covers anything that could ignite the
gas — the ignition transformer, a heating engineer with a match, and so on.
Directly related to that, we also need to record the physical property that
lets the system ignite the gas:
∃I : interval T ·
(
(IgnitionSource ∧ Concentration ≥ IgnitionMin) over I
⇒ Combustion over I
)
This formula is an existentially quantified predicate as it is entirely possible for
the gas to not ignite, even in the presence of a spark.
More difficult to express is the notion that combustion reduces the amount
of gas in the environment. Part of the difficulty is that a fully general statement
of this has to talk about gas flow rates, combustion rates, and environmental
dissipation, at the very least. The approach taken here is to codify three cases
around the GasSource and Combustion variables in an attempt to create the
outer bounds of a fully general statement.
∀I , J : interval T ·
(
I adjoins J ∧ ¬GasSource over (I ∪ J )
⇒ ∫
I
Concentration >
∫
J
Concentration
)
This case is the simplest of the three: if there is no gas being added to the envi-
ronment then the overall concentration of gas in the atmosphere will decrease.
∀I , J : interval T ·

GasSource over (I ∪ J ) ∧
(¬Combustion ∧ ¬ IgnitionSource) over (I ∪ J ) ∧
(Concentration ≤ EquilibriumLevel) over I
⇒ ∫
I
Concentration ≤ ∫
J
Concentration

The above formula gives us the situation where gas is being added to the en-
vironment but it is not lit and there is nothing to ignite it. Here we have the
overall concentration of gas increasing.
∀I : interval T ·
(
(GasSource ∧ Combustion) over I
⇒ (Concentration ≤ EquilibriumLevel) over I
)
Finally, if the gas is on and lit, then the overall concentration of gas will not
exceed a concentration where gas is being added at the same rate as it is being
consumed (by dissipation and/or combustion).
The use of EquilibriumLevel in the past few paragraphs is a simplification
made to prevent us from going into a long investigation of combustible gases, fluid
dynamics, and dissipation rates in different environments. Its intended meaning
is simply to act as a mechanism to allow us to note that, say, if the gas is on
and burning then there will be a concentration of gas in the environment that
will be maintained.
The last physical property that we will quickly look at in detail deals with
the possibility of explosions.
∀I : interval T ·
(
(Concentration < ExplosionMin) over I
⇒ ¬Explosion over I
)
Simply put, if there is not enough gas to cause an explosion then we will not get
one.
∃I : interval T ·
(
(Concentration ≥ ExplosionMin) over I
⇒ Explosion over I
)
This property is permissive rather than mandatory as it is possible for the con-
centration of gas to exceed the minimum required for an explosion without ac-
tually causing the explosion. While it is not likely that a spark will fail to ignite
a large concentration of gas, it is possible. And, since we have weakened the
property into a permissive one, it is not necessary to add IgnitionSource to the
formula.
There are, of course, other properties that could — and should — be included
within PhysicalProperties; only a few of the more interesting are presented here.
The GluingAssumptions conjunct is a complement to the assumptions about
the general physical properties of the environment. In them we make explicit
what it is we assume that the physical components of our system do.
In some cases the state of our equipment implies that a property of the
environment is true, for instance:
∀I : interval T ·
 (GasFlow ⇒ GasSource) ∧(Spark ⇒ IgnitionSource) ∧
(Flame ⇒ Combustion)
 over I
This formula relates variables in the PhysicalProperties to the output variables of
the system. Specifically, if the gas is on in the system then we can conclude that
there is a source of gas in the environment; when the ignition transformer is on
then there is a means to cause ignition; and when the system is producing a flame
then we have combustion. The formula does not, however, imply the converse,
as it is not necessarily true that the only means of ignition is sparks from the
ignition transformer; it is entirely possible that a person could be holding a lit
match near the nozzle.
The Idealisations conjunct constrains the required scope of the specification,
excluding failures from consideration. The properties expressed in Idealisations
are, over long periods of time, certainly false in any real environment. They are,
however, true most of the time, and are necessary to give the normal behaviour
of the system.
One part of the Idealisations conjunct is essentially the converse of part of
the GluingAssumptions:
∀I : interval T ·
 (GasSource ⇒ GasFlow) ∧(IgnitionSource ⇒ Spark) ∧
(Combustion ⇒ Flame)
 over I
This allows us to assume that there is nothing in the environment that can
directly interfere with the operation of the gas-burner. For example, because
of the formula above we can be certain that there are no other sources of gas
that could help cause an explosion the next time the gas-burner tries to ignite a
flame.
The rest of the Idealisations conjunct includes things to force some of the
permissive parts of PhysicalProperties to become mandatory. For example,
∀I : interval T ·
 IgnitionSource ∧Concentration ≥ IgnitionMin
⇒ Combustion
 over I
takes the physical property that allows gas to ignite if the concentration is high
enough and there is a spark and adds the constraint that it must happen.
3.3 Idealised Guarantee-Conditions
The guarantee-conditions describe the behaviour that can be expected from a
given system. In the case of the idealised gas-burner the behaviour is straight-
forward.
The OperationalProperties conjunct of the guarantee-condition has a short
definition:
OperationalProperties 4
∀I : interval T · ((Temperature ≤ HeatThreshold)⇔ Flame) over I
The operational behaviour is just that when the environmental temperature is
less than a certain threshold then the system should be burning gas; otherwise,
it should not be burning gas. The formula above has been simplified by the
omission of any time delay between turning the gas on and igniting the gas, and
it also does not consider stuttering when the value of Temperature is close to
the value of HeatThreshold . We can, however, justify this development using the
rely-conditions that we have written.
The LowConcentrationLevel conjunct is the formalisation of the condition
that the concentration of gas in the environment must not exceed a certain safe
threshold to avoid things like explosions.
∀I : interval T · (Concentration ≤ SafeMax ) over I
The justification that satisfying this property prevents explosions relies directly
on the physical property that they cannot happen if the concentration of gas in
the environment is below a certain level, and that SafeMax is always below that
level.
4 Adding Fault-Tolerance
One objection to the idealised specification is that it is impossible to find an
environment that could satisfy the rely-conditions, not to mention equipment
that never fails.
We need the system to have fault-tolerant properties then, and it is important
to first consider how to add such properties to the system. Our approach to fault-
tolerance — indeed, one of the major goals of it — is to keep the fault-handling
behaviour separate from the ordinary behaviour as much as possible. This allows
us the freedom to create idealised specification that are largely uncluttered by
special cases.
These uncluttered specifications are then composed into a larger specifica-
tion with provision to handle the faults. The additional material in the larger
specification does not have to deal with the system’s ordinary behaviour and can
be a clean description of what is required to deal with the fault.
There are two operators proposed in [1] for use when composing specifica-
tions: until/allows and until/requires, i.e.:
OrdinarySpec until Condition allows FaultBehaviourSpec
The particular example they use to explain the operators is related to fault
detection and correction, although other uses of those structures can be imag-
ined. Both operators result in a system that will behave as OrdinarySpec unless
Condition is satisfied. In the case of until/requires the composed system imme-
diately starts behaving as specified in FaultBehaviourSpec. For until/allows, the
composed system can continue as it has been, and optionally change behaviour
at any future time so long as Condition still holds. These operators do not have
quite the right semantics for the purposes of our example, however, as neither
of them allow a return to the ordinary behaviour specification.
We will here propose syntax for another, similar, structure:
OrdinarySpec until Condition corrects FaultBehaviourSpec
As with the two structures from [1], the composed system will initially behave
as OrdinarySpec provides. And, as with until/requires, if the condition holds,
this structure requires that the composed system’s behaviour becomes that of
FaultBehaviourSpec. The specification of FaultBehaviourSpec is limited to the
precisely the same set of variables named in the external, inputs, and outputs
keywords of the OrdinarySpec system. The composed system preserves the reifi-
cation of the variables within the composition. Unlike either of the composition
structures from [1], the specification of FaultBehaviourSpec must provide a test
similar to a post-condition to indicate when the condition that triggered the
fault behaviour has been corrected. Once that post-condition holds the com-
posed system returns to behaving like OrdinarySpec. The intuition behind this
composition operator is to segregate the ordinary behaviour of the system from
the fault-correcting behaviour.
Returning to our idealised specification, we need to consider how to make the
system more robust. The most obvious fault — touched on when the Idealisations
conjunct was described — is the potential for the spark to fail to ignite the gas at
the nozzle. If the gas fails to ignite it is unsafe to continue to attempt to ignite it
as the concentration of unlit gas can quickly build up to unsafe levels. A desired
safety property would be to ensure that in the face of repeated ignition failure
the concentration of gas in the environment does not exceed some given level.
This property would have the effect of preventing an explosive concentration of
gas from occurring. The behaviour that satisfies this property, then, is that if the
gas fails to ignite the system should shut off the valve and ignition transformer
and wait until the concentration has reduced.
We can compose a system specification that handles an ignition failure using
until/corrects:
GasBurnerSystem1 4
GasBurnerSystem0 until IgnitionFailure corrects PurgeWait0
This composition creates a system, GasBurnerSystem1, that behaves like the
GasBurnerSystem0 system unless IgnitionFailure ever holds. If IgnitionFailure
holds, then GasBurnerSystem1 will behave as specified for the PurgeWait0
system. The composed system will continue to behave as PurgeWait0 even if
IgnitionFailure ceases to be true. Only when the post-condition of PurgeWait0
is satisfied can the composed system return to behaving as GasBurnerSystem0.
The definition of IgnitionFailure is given as a lambda function rather than
a system, as the intention is to apply this over intervals during the operation of
GasBurnerSystem0, rather than use it directly as a system specification.
IgnitionFailure 4
λI : interval T ·#I > MaxIgnitionWait∧(GasFlow∧¬Flame) over I
This predicate will be true when the system has had the gas on, but not achieved
ignition over a period longer than MaxIgnitionWait .
Our corrective system, PurgeWait0, is intended to turn off the gas and igni-
tion transformer and wait for the gas level to dissipate.
PurgeWait0 4
system
external Concentration
outputs GasFlow ,Spark ,Flame
rely PhysicalProperties ∧GluingAssumptions
guarantee SystemOff
post LowConcentrationRestored
The rely-conditions of the system when it is just waiting for gas to dissipate are
similar to GasBurnerSystem0, but the Idealisations conjunct is no longer needed
or desired. The guarantee-condition is defined as
SystemOff 4 ∀I : interval T · (¬GasFlow ∧ ¬Spark ∧ ¬Flame) over I
and, not surprisingly, requires that the system keep everything turned off.
The post-condition of this system is defined in terms of the environment
LowConcentrationRestored 4
∃I : interval T ·
(Concentration ≤ LowConcentrationThreshold) over I
This definition of the post-condition is unusual in that it allows the system to
be considered finished whenever a suitable time interval is found. There is a
semantic assumption that the system is done as soon as the post-condition can
be satisfied, rather than at any arbitrary point after the post-condition has been
satisfied.
5 Deriving the Controller
Up to this point we have been dealing with the specification of the overall system
rather than that of the controller. The derivation of this controller’s specification
follows in two main steps: first, we establish a specification for the controller in
terms of the system-level variables; and second, we reify that specification to
cast it solely in terms of the signals that the controller can actually access.
A derivation step using this method is, conceptually, the process of moving
from the specification of an overall system to that of a subsystem. This is, in
a sense, the reverse of pushing out the boundaries of the overall system. When
we were pushing out the boundaries we were attempting to bring more elements
into consideration to understand the overall system. During the derivation we
are shifting our focus back to the portion of the overall system which we must
design, but in the process keeping the relevant elements of the overall system in
the specification.
During a derivation step we allow existing variables given with the input and
output keywords to be moved to the external keyword. New variables can be
introduced into the specification as long as there is a part of the rely-condition
that relates them to the external variables. The rely-conditions can be weakened
to allow for a greater variety of behaviour on the part of the environment, and
guarantee-conditions can be strengthened to give a tighter constraint on the
behaviour of the system. Formally, the rely-condition of the original system
must imply the rely-condition of the derived system, and the conjunction of the
rely- and guarantee-conditions of the derived system must imply the guarantee-
condition of the original system.
5.1 The Derivation
The first step is to derive an idealised controller directly from the idealised
system.
GasBurnerController0 4
system
external Concentration,Temperature,GasFlow ,Spark ,Flame
inputs HeatRequest ,FlameDetected
outputs ValvePosition, IgnitionTransformer
rely PhysicalProperties ∧GluingAssumptions ∧ Idealisations ∧
SignalCorrespondences
guarantee OperationalProperties ∧ LowConcentrationLevel
The main differences between the controller and the system are in the input
and output variables. In a sense we have just moved the boundary of the system
that we are considering inwards from the whole gas-burner to just the processing
unit, and this is precisely the approach we want to take. All of the input and
output variables of the whole system are now considered external variables as the
controller does not have access to them. The guarantee-condition can be taken
directly from the overall system for this stage of the controller specification, as
the external behavioural requirements are unchanged.
The rely-condition has a new conjunct that is required to relate the state
of the variables that the controller can directly access to the external variables
which it cannot. For brevity they are presented here under the assumption that
the correspondence between the signals and reality is faultless, but a full speci-
fication would have to be sensitive to that.
SignalCorrespondences 4
∀I : interval T ·
HeatRequest ⇔ (Temperature ≤ HeatThreshold) over I ∧
∀I : interval T ·
FlameDetected ⇔ Flame ∧ValvePosition ⇔ GasFlow ∧
IgnitionTransformer ⇔ Spark
 over I
Of itself, SignalCorrespondences is just the straight mapping of a signal to the
external state that it represents.
The idealised controller needs to be composed in a similar manner as the
idealised system to gain a controller that can tolerate faults.
FTGasBurnerController0 4
GasBurnerController0 until DetectionFailure corrects PurgeWait1
The IgnitionFailure condition that was used in GasBurnerSystem1 becomes
DetectionFailure in this composition. We have defined it in terms of the sig-
nals that are available in GasBurnerController0:
DetectionFailure 4
λI : interval T · #I ≥ MaxIgnitionWait ∧
(ValvePosition ∧ ¬FlameDetected) over I
In this definition we has used the signals ValvePosition and FlameDetected
rather than the variables GasFlow and Flame; from the SignalCorrespondences
conjunct of the rely-condition we can know DetectionFailure and IgnitionFailure
will hold under the same conditions.
The corrective system PurgeWait1 bears the same relation to PurgeWait0
as GasBurnerController0 does to GasBurnerSystem0.
PurgeWait1 4
system
external Concentration,GasFlow ,Spark ,Flame
outputs ValvePosition, IgnitionTransformer
rely PhysicalProperties ∧GluingAssumptions ∧SignalCorrespondences
guarantee SystemOff
post LowConcentrationRestored
As with GasBurnerController0, all of the system-level variables have become ex-
ternal variables, and SignalCorrespondences is introduced into the rely-condition
to relate the signals the controller can access to the physical state external to
the controller.
5.2 The Reification
The second phase of deriving the specification of the controller is the process of
removing all of the references to external variables while retaining the system’s
behaviour. This involves specifying a new guarantee that — given the rely-
condition of the unreified controller — implies the unreified guarantee-condition;
as well as recasting the unreified rely-condition purely in terms of the input and
output variables.
The idealised, reified specification for the controller becomes:
GasBurnerController1 4
system
inputs HeatRequest ,FlameDetected
outputs ValvePosition, IgnitionTransformer
rely SignalProperties ∧ SignalIdealisations
guarantee OperationalProperties1
In this specification the external variables are completely eliminated, but the
inputs and outputs are precisely the same as in GasBurnerController0. The
rely- and guarantee-conditions are very different from the unreified controller
specification.
To give the basis for how the signals work we have the SignalProperties
conjunct of the rely-condition. This is, essentially, a version of the original
PhysicalProperties expressed in terms of the input and output signals. Its justi-
fication is based on the use of SignalCorrespondences, such that
(PhysicalProperties ∧ SignalCorrespondences) ⇒ SignalProperties
To illustrate one particular part of SignalProperties, consider the physical prop-
erty that allows combustion in the presence of both gas and an ignition source.
This properties is defined in SignalProperties as
∃I : interval T ·
(
ValvePosition ∧ IgnitionTransformer
⇒ FlameDetected
)
over I
which states that if we turn on the IgnitionTransformer and ValvePosition sig-
nals then we might get the FlameDetected signal turned on.
The idealisations that the reified version of the controller relies on are — un-
surprisingly — semantically the same as those used by the unreified controller;
they are, however, expressed in terms of the signals. Parallel to the permissive
property on ignition, above, the idealisation that ignition is mandatory is ex-
pressed as:
∀I : interval T ·
(
ValvePosition ∧ IgnitionTransformer
⇒ FlameDetected
)
over I
Fully specified, SignalIdealisations plays the same role of removing the possibility
of failures from the reified controller specification as Idealisations does for the
unreified controller and the whole system.
The reified controller cannot directly guarantee any behaviour relative to
the whole system without the external variables, so its guarantee-condition,
OperationalProperties1 must be written in terms of the input and output vari-
ables.
OperationalProperties1 4
∀ I : interval T ·(
HeatRequest ⇔ ValvePosition ∧
(HeatRequest ∧ ¬FlameDetected)⇔ IgnitionTransformer
)
over I
The first part of the quantified expression requires that the system will keep the
ValvePosition signal on when the HeatRequest signal is on and off when there it
is off; given the SignalCorrespondences we know that this will keep the gas on
when there is a heat request and off when there is not.
The second part of the quantified expression controls the IgnitionTransformer
signal, ensuring that it is on only when the HeatRequest signal is on and the
FlameDetected signal is off. Again, given the SignalCorrespondences, we know
that this will only engage the actual ignition transformer when the gas valve is
open and there is a heat request.
Moving from the idealised to fault-tolerant version of the reified controller,
we compose it in the same manner as before:
FTGasBurnerController1 4
GasBurnerController1 until DetectionFailure corrects PurgeWait2
Because we have already defined DetectionFailure in terms of the signals we do
not need another version of it; the corrective specification, however, does require
reification.
PurgeWait2 4
system
outputs ValvePosition, IgnitionTransformer
guarantee SignalsOff
post MinPurgeTimeExceeded
The lack of any input or external variables removes need for a rely-condition in
the reified PurgeWait2 specification. Recall that the reification is not attempting
to preserve the description of what the whole system is doing, but rather is
merely trying to preserve the observable behaviour of the system’s input and
output variables. The guarantee-condition is defined as
SignalsOff 4
∀I : interval T · (¬ValvePosition ∧ ¬ IgnitionTransformer) over I
which keeps the controller’s output signals off during the period when the correc-
tive behaviour is dominant. It is easy to see that this will be the same behaviour
as PurgeWait1.
The post-condition of the reified corrective system is very different than the
unreified version.
MinPurgeTimeExceeded 4 ∃I : interval T ·#I ≥ MinPurgeTime
The post-condition changes from being directly concerned with the concentration
of gas in the environment to being concerned only with finding a duration of time
that is sufficiently long. The justification for this comes from the selection of the
length of MinPurgeTime and PhysicalProperties; the former must be shown to
be long enough, using the dissipation properties in the latter, to reduce the
concentration of gas so that LowConcentrationRestored is satisfied.
6 Conclusions
This example has been developed using a method that is still being actively
developed by Hayes, Jackson, and Jones. Tackling these and similar further ex-
amples will inevitably refine the method described in [1]. Further effort includes
creating a library of examples — including this one — to create a body of work
that can serve as a guide to practitioners.
In the longer term, it should be possible to use such a library of examples to
generate a set of “HJJ patterns”, not unlike the design patterns [10] currently
used by practitioners of object-oriented development. Even if a set of pattern-
like structures cannot be developed, a full set of guidelines for using this method
is required.
The composition of specifications given with this method, in senses of both
subproblems and whole specifications, is a topic that remains to be fully explored.
The task of creating a specification for a system’s “normal” operation seems well
understood, and creating the specification with weaker rely-conditions for the
“abnormal” system behaviour is equally straightforward. However, the problem
of combining such specifications is a problem that demands further study.
The basic ideas involved in the Jones’ rely-conditions, while good at recording
interference, leave gaps when it comes to notions such as ensuring that the system
can make progress. Work such as Stølen’s on wait-conditions [11] addresses some
of these issues, and should be included in this method.
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